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A Babe in the Woods: An Essay on Kirby Lumber
and the Evolution of Corporate Law
Lawrence A. Hamermesh1
The Setting
The account below parallels the content of an interview on November 8, 2019, in
which my former colleague Professor Paul Regan guided a conversation with me about
my career in corporate law, and the major themes and trends that emerged in the course
of that career. What follows, however, is not anything close to a verbatim transcript of
that interview; rather, it lays out in narrative prose the points I intended to cover, and
mostly did cover, during the interview.
This is a personal, even self-centered, account. The rationale for that approach is
that quite by chance, my career as a Delaware corporate law practitioner, law professor,
and legislative drafter happened to coincide with an extended period (since 1976) of
dramatic evolution of corporate law. At least in hindsight, I see in my own experience the
emergence of trends and issues that have been and remain at the forefront of corporate
law. I am grateful to Professor Regan for engaging in the conversation, to Professor
Bruce Grohsgal for arranging the interview, and to the Pileggi family for sponsoring the
long-standing and prestigious lecture series of which my interview was the most recent,
but by no means most impressive, entry.2
Introduction to the Practice of Corporate Law
When I joined the Wilmington, Delaware law firm of Morris, Nichols, Arsht &
Tunnell in June of 1976 as a new associate fresh out of law school, I was escorted upon
arrival to the office of S. Samuel Arsht, then regarded as a “dean” of the Delaware
1

Professor Emeritus, Widener University Delaware Law School; Executive Director,
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School Institute for Law and Economics. The
author gratefully acknowledges the excellent research assistance provided by Marina
Masterson, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ’21.
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The list of formidable presenters in this series is available at Past Lectures, DEL. J.
CORP. L. OF WIDENER U. DEL. L. SCH. (2019),
https://delawarelaw.widener.edu/files/resources/2019pileggimaterialsabout.pdf.
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corporate bar. Mr. Arsht (as I then thought of him) welcomed me graciously, and it
became apparent that he had a puckish, good-humored twinkle in his eye: noting that I
had just graduated from law school, he suggested that at this point I knew everything
there was to know about the law. I assured him that, to the contrary, I had learned really
nothing in law school, to which he replied that perhaps we were all in trouble then – or
something like that.
In any event, I promptly got my first assignment: preparing a legal memo about
estoppel relating to a pending statutory appraisal case, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.3 I
dutifully completed the memo4 and did some other work on the post-trial and appellate
briefing, but did not even begin to recognize the momentous issues of corporate law
lurking in the case. One of those issues may be more familiar to students of corporate and
securities law than the appraisal litigation I worked on: the short-form freezeout merger
by which Santa Fe Industries acquired the minority shares of Kirby Lumber gave rise to
federal litigation in which the United States Supreme Court famously ruled that
allegations of fiduciary misconduct by the controlling stockholder failed to state a claim
cognizable under SEC Rule 10b-5, but rather involved state law claims of breach of
fiduciary duty that had to be presented in state court.5 Had the Supreme Court come out
the other way, the explosion of fiduciary duty litigation that marked the takeover era of
the 1980s and swallowed up me and my colleagues at the Delaware Bar would likely
have occupied a very different venue, and my own legal career would have turned out
very differently.6

3

Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 395 A.2d 730 (Del. Ch. 1978), aff’d, 413 A.2d 137 (Del.
1980).
4

The memo analyzed whether our client should be estopped to present an expert opinion
about the value of Kirby’s assets that was different and substantially lower than the
valuation presented in the information statement that accompanied the freezeout merger
that gave rise to the proceeding. Our position prevailed, largely because of the view that a
party’s statement or contention cannot limit the valuation discretion or judgment of the
tribunal. Id. at 737-739.
5

Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 362 (1977).

6

See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s
Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 144-45 (2015).
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Premiums, Discounts, and Market Price
But I was at best dimly aware of these matters at the time. I was only slightly
more cognizant of other lurking issues in the case, issues that would grow into matters of
raging contention among scholars, practitioners and judges of corporate law. These issues
stemmed from the oddity that Kirby Lumber, a forest products manufacturer with
extensive timber holdings in East Texas and Louisiana, could have assets deemed worth
$456 per share on a liquidation basis, but at the same time generate earnings that implied
a value of only about $120 per share.7 What could possibly explain this enormous
disparity? And absent a satisfactory explanation, why wouldn’t the controlling
stockholder, as a rational business actor, simply liquidate or sell the company rather than
continue to operate it? Conversely (and this is the position we took on behalf of the
respondent), if Kirby was going to continue to be operated as it had been, on a sustained
yield forestry principle, why should a stockholder be entitled to an appraisal award that
included any value attributable to a hypothetical liquidation or sale that was not going to
occur?
The court-appointed appraiser in the Kirby Lumber appraisal case,8 whose
decision was upheld by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme
Court, took something of a Solomonic approach to these questions:9 he declined to place
primary weight on the liquidation value of Kirby’s assets because precedent dictated that
the dissenters’ shares be valued as a proportional interest in a going concern, rather than
as a liquidating concern; he likewise declined to place primary weight on the estimated
value of Kirby’s earnings potential; and instead he assigned a sixty percent weight to
earnings value, and a forty percent weight to asset value because, as the Chancellor

7

Kirby Lumber, 395 A.2d at 733.

8

Rodman Ward, Jr., a formidable litigator and leading figure in the Delaware Bar, who
co-founded the Wilmington, Delaware, branch of the international law firm Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP.
9

At the time of the Kirby Lumber appraisal litigation, the Delaware courts rigorously
adhered to the so-called “Delaware block method” of determining the fair value of shares
being appraised – in which several valuation factors were assessed and assigned weights.
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields
in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 124 (2005).
3
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explained, asset value “constitutes a substantial benefit of which a minority stockholder
should not be deprived because of a merger,” “even though [Kirby Lumber] depends
upon its manufacturing capabilities for its means of income.”10
That resolution may have put the Kirby Lumber appraisal case to rest, but even
though I did not fully appreciate it at the time, the asset value/earnings value disparity
foreshadowed some critically important debates in law and economics. For one thing, that
disparity appears in hindsight to have been the leading edge of a phenomenon that starkly
characterized the most celebrated takeover bids in the early 1980s: the apparent
willingness of takeover bidders to offer enormous premiums over share market prices,
especially for natural resource companies, like Unocal, Gulf Oil, Phillips Petroleum, and
more.11 That phenomenon introduced me to the teachings of law and economics, albeit
what was a somewhat naïve application of the discipline. The leading practitioners of that
discipline, confident in the market’s judgment about the value of a widely traded stock,
asserted that any tender offer at a premium to market price must be wealth enhancing.12
10

Kirby Lumber, 395 A.2d at 741.

11

See, e.g., G. Christian Hill, Jonathan Dahl & Edwin A. Finn, Jr., Mesa’s Pickens and
Partner Plan to Seek 10% of Phillips Petroleum at $60 a Share—Bid is Regarded as
First Step by Oilman to Gain Control of Oklahoma Competitor, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5,
1984 (reporting that Mesa’s bid for Phillips Petroleum constituted a thirty-one percent
premium over the share price as of two days prior); Mark Potts & Peter Behr, Gulf
Accepts Bid by Socal; Merger Would Be Largest, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1984, at A1
(reporting that Gulf accepted a bid of $80 per share, while its stock had only been trading
at $57.25 per share two months earlier); Nancy Rivera & Debra Whitefield, Unocal
Board Rejects Mesa Takeover Bid; Pickens Group Says it has Already Lined Up Needed
Financing, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1985, at 1 (reporting that Unocal shares were trading at
less than $34 before the bidder made its offer of $54).
12

Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165-75 (1981)
(arguing that markets are in fact efficient, and premium tender offers benefit shareholders
of the target corporation, the bidder, and the industry by reducing agency costs). This
assertion, of course, failed to reckon with the two-tiered/partial takeover bid tactic that
would be employed most notably by Mesa Petroleum in its purported quest to acquire
Unocal. In that bid form, the overall value of the bid is obscured by any uncertainty about
the value to be paid in any second-step merger, and in any event the structure of the bid
substantially vitiates any voluntariness and market reliability in stockholders’ responses
to the bid. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, UNOCAL at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 796-97 (2006) (explaining that the mere possibility
of a less favorable second-step payout coerces shareholders to tender); see also Robert A.
4
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As a corollary, they claimed, any action by directors – motivated necessarily, they said,
by personal interest in preserving their positions – to impede the consummation of such
wealth-enhancing transactions must be allowed, if at all, only upon a substantial
demonstration by the directors that their actions were directed toward economic benefit to
the target – a burden not unlike that required by the rigorous “entire fairness” standard of
judicial review of transactions tainted by conflict of interest.13
These law and economics-based claims accompanied another enduring response
to the conundrum posed by the Kirby Lumber value disparity: namely, that this disparity
existed in significant part because of agency costs – costs due to managerial inefficiency
arising from disloyalty, negligence, or lack of diligence, or some combination of these
flaws.14 It was further posited that a vibrant market for corporate control – in the form of
tender offers undeterred by defensive devices adopted by target company directors – was
a critical mechanism for reducing those agency costs, thereby enhancing social and
shareholder welfare and reducing the disparity between share market prices and the
underlying value of firms.15

Prentice, Front-End Loaded, Two-Tier Tender Offers: An Examination of the
Counterproductive Effects of a Mighty Offensive Weapon, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 389,
395-97 (1988-89).
13

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1201-03 (proposing a rule of “managerial
passivity” where directors are barred from all defensive actions except ordinary business
and press releases); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain
From Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277 (1984) (presenting evidence to
argue that shareholders and markets more largely suffer when managers defeat tender
offers); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of
fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction,
he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful
scrutiny by the courts.”).
14

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1168-70 (positing that agency costs decrease
the trading value of shares); see generally, Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (showing that the agency relationship incentivizes managers to act
in their own interest, affecting the firm’s value).
15

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 1173-74. The idea is that agency costs are
exacerbated by the free-riding tendencies among shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel
argue that takeovers help reduce agency costs because the bidder assumes a high enough
5
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Needless to say, corporate managers and their advocates were having none of this.
They maintained that actions to frustrate unsolicited tender offers at a premium to market
price were justifiable because market prices did not reliably reflect firm value and that
there were numerous explanations beyond agency costs why a bidder might offer a
substantial premium over market price to acquire an entire company.16 This camp had its
own corollary: director actions to frustrate an unsolicited takeover bid should be judged
in the courts the same way as any other corporate decision, i.e., under the deferential
business judgment rule.17
Corporate Constituencies and the Universal Shareholder

number of shares to benefit from monitoring managers. Moreover, the unfettered threat of
takeover would incentivize managers to self-monitor and reduce agency costs.
16

See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted”
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 893-901 (1988)
(cataloguing explanations for takeover premiums); see also Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids
in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 106-09 (1979) (presenting evidence that
rejecting tender offers frequently does benefit shareholders in the long run).
The tension within Delaware case law about the valuation significance to attach to
share market prices surely merits its own article. Compare Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172
A. 452, 455 (1934) (“Even when conditions are normal and no economic forces are at
work unduly to exalt or depress the financial hopes of man, market quotations are not
safe to accept as unerring expressions of value. The relation of supply to demand on a
given day as truly affects the market value of a stock as it does of a commodity; and
temporary supply and demand are in turn affected by numerous circumstances which are
wholly disconnected from considerations having to do with the stock's inherent worth.”),
with Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 24 (Del.
2017) (“[T]he efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by this Court … teaches that the
price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value
than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to
the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client.”). The tension may not reflect
contradiction, however: one could determine “fair value” based on a stock price
generated in an informationally efficient market, yet recognize that it is at best an
imperfect (and therefore perhaps incorrect) proxy due to noise trading or some other form
of market failure. Moreover, a board of directors could conclude that even a bid in excess
of a fundamentally accurate share market price could be inadequate if an even higher sale
price could be achieved through a bid premised on more robust synergies.
17

Lipton, supra note 16, at 115-16 (“[T]he policy considerations are overwhelmingly in
favor of [the business judgment rule]”).
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When the Delaware Supreme Court confronted and resolved the doctrinal battle in
its 1985 opinion in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc.,18 it opted for an ostensibly
middle ground, acknowledging director authority to resist takeover bids but promising
some form of enhanced judicial scrutiny.19 In so doing, however, it threw fuel on the fire
of yet another persistent struggle in corporate law that was implicit in the Kirby Lumber
case. To explain: Unocal famously stated that directors evaluating a takeover bid should
consider, among other things, “the [bid’s] impact on ‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally).”20 That statement excited the ardor of those who had urged that directors can
and should manage the corporation with a view not only toward maximizing shareholder
financial wealth, but as well toward advancing the interests of others affected by
corporate conduct.21
As thus framed, the debate about the purpose of the corporation has played out as
a battle between the interests of shareholders and the interests of other constituencies
affected by corporate conduct. Indeed, that putative dichotomy was what the Delaware
Supreme Court articulated in Unocal and reinforced in Revlon, where it declared that
maximizing the current financial value of the corporation’s shares is the primary goal of
the board of directors, to the exclusion of consideration of any other constituencies, when

18

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

19

Id. at 955 (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”). In hindsight,
however, what thus might have appeared as an at least moderately robust approach to
judicial review evolved into an approach that is rhetorically distinct but substantively
similar to the business judgment rule. See Paul Regan, What’s Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 947, 967-68 (2001) (arguing that Delaware case law has “dramatically
expanded the scope of ‘threats’ justifying defensive responses under Unocal,” weakening
the enhanced judicial scrutiny of defensive actions).
20

Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.

21

See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 308 (1999) (arguing that Unocal “squarely rejects shareholder
primacy in favor of the view that the interests of the ‘corporation’ include the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies”); see generally, Lipton, supra note 16, at 105-06
(supporting the idea that corporations are responsible to stakeholders other than
shareholders).
7
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selling a company.22 Driven to its logical conclusion, and further reinforced in the eBay
opinion of the Court of Chancery,23 maximization of stockholder financial wealth is the
essence of stockholder primacy and the purpose that all corporate action must serve.24
I resist only part of that conclusion. I fully accept the concept of stockholder
primacy that posits that the interests of stockholders are what the board of directors is
charged with serving. Any contrary notion that directors can or should simultaneously
serve any conflicting interests of non-stockholder constituencies is largely illusory in any
event, even where a governing statute purports to enable directors to consider such other
interests: how seriously can one take such a statute when the only constituency within the
corporation with the power to vote on the election of directors is the stockholders?25
Given that allocation of voting power, how likely is it that directors will address and

22

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(“[C]oncern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active
bidders is in progress, and the object . . . [is] to sell it to the highest bidder.”).
23

eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (confirming
that directors of for-profit corporations must prioritize “the value of the corporation for
the benefit of its stockholders” over interest in community welfare and philanthropy); see
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of
the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 776-77 (2015) (referring to eBay as
“hornbook law” that acting in an interest separate and other from stockholder wealth is a
breach of fiduciary duty). But see Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form:
Corporate Law and Benefit Corps, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 270, 274-75 (arguing that
because the eBay opinion cites no precedent supporting its language about shareholder
primacy, the issue is “legally unsettled”).
24

See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) (“[A]
corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a view
to enhancing corporate profits and shareholder gain,” limited by the duty to act lawfully,
the right to act ethically, and the authority to serve nonshareholder constituents if it
benefits shareholders in the long run).
25

See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. &
ECON. 395, 403 (1983) (noting that managers’ knowledge that shareholders have
exclusive voting power in elections “tends to cause managers to act in shareholders’
interest in order to advance their own careers and to avoid being ousted”); Julian Velasco,
Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 909-10 (2010)
(explaining that shareholders have significant, albeit underestimated, influence over
directors because of their voting power).
8
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satisfy interests of non-stockholder groups when those interests conflict with the interests
of stockholders?
Accepting stockholder primacy, however, only answers half the question of
corporate purpose, because even if it tells us that the interests of stockholders are
paramount, it does not tell us how to define what those interests actually are. This latter
inquiry brings me back, again, to Kirby Lumber. If Kirby Lumber’s operating policy of
harvesting timber only on a sustained yield basis was grounded in considerations of
environmental impact, it at least raised the possibility that the company was being
managed with the interests of the larger community, and not just the stockholders, in
mind. Perhaps as a result of that management approach, the company as a going concern
was not achieving the maximum value to stockholders that would have been generated by
a less environmentally friendly decision to clear-cut and sell off the company’s timber
reserves. In short, the puzzling value disparity noted earlier may have stemmed at least in
part from a managerial orientation that was suboptimal from the standpoint of the
hypothetical stockholder focused only on financial returns.26
One possible response to this conundrum is that Kirby Lumber had a controlling
stockholder, Santa Fe Industries, whose economic interest, coupled with its control, could
be counted on to assure that Kirby Lumber was managed in the interest of stockholders.
That response unravels, however, when one recognizes that Santa Fe Industries itself was
a publicly held firm whose managers may not have been sufficiently accountable to
stockholders to assure that stockholder wealth would be the guidepost for its management
of Kirby Lumber. In other words, a failure to maximize Kirby Lumber’s value may have
been just another instance of mismanagement due to insufficient accountability to
shareholders.
This line of thinking, however, masks an unstated, and incorrect, assumption.
In short, the hypothetical stockholder who cares only about maximizing the current
financial value of her investment is just that – hypothetical – and a model of corporate
law and governance that assumes that such a person not only exists, but predominates, is
simply unrealistic. It may be unrealistic in a usefully convenient way: it distills any

26

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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inquiry about corporate decision-making down to a more or less manageable question of
finance – namely, what decision today will result in the greatest current value of the
corporation’s shares? But the millions of actual human beings whose capital is invested
in corporate stock do not consider that question dispositive.27 For one thing, the
stockholder owning shares of Kirby Lumber will not want Kirby to clear cut its forests,
even if that would maximize the value of those Kirby shares, if the result would be to
impose an even greater offsetting loss in value of shares that same person owned in a
company in the business of managing a resort that depended on an idyllic view of Kirby’s
woodlands. Negative externalities imposed by corporate behavior hit the pocketbooks of
other corporations, and given widely practiced diversification of share ownership,28 a
holder of Corporation A’s shares, even if motivated by purely financial considerations,
will not necessarily support value-maximizing conduct by A that imposes offsetting
impairment of the value of that holder’s shares of Corporations B, C, and D.29
But the problem goes well beyond purely financial externalities and portfolio
diversification. For the hypothetical, current share value-focused stockholder, clearcutting the Kirby forests and pocketing the proceeds might have been the best strategy for
the board of directors to embrace. But the real human beings who were the ultimate
investors in Kirby Lumber may have attached value to entirely different considerations.
26

Lynn Stout’s The Shareholder Value Myth (2012) points out that shareholders have
varying interests besides maximizing current value. Indeed, short-term investors may
have the traditional interest in maximizing firm value now, but long-term shareholders
may want the company to invest in building talent, product development, and reputation.
Id. at 69. And, as Stout argues, many individuals are willing to forego some profit in the
interest of ethics and social responsibility.
27

See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 178-79 (10th ed. 2011) (discussing the value and impact of
diversification, and noting that “[m]ost investors do not put all their eggs into one basket:
They diversify”).
29

See Stout, supra note 21, at 307 (arguing that shareholders who are highly diversified
may not be interested in immediate maximization of the firm’s value if it threatens the
value of other investments); see generally Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr.,
Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified
Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 43 (1996) (showing that
diversified stockholders should disfavor value maximization by one firm and instead
favor portfolio value maximization).
10
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They may have strongly preferred, for psychic and perhaps even financial reasons, that
Kirby Lumber limit its timber harvest so that, without sacrificing at least some level of
financial returns, the company’s forest lands would continue to serve as carbon sinks and
viable habitat for countless species, as well as a sustainable source of useful timber far
into the future.30
In these respects, then, holders of corporate shares are “universal” owners, with
interests extending well beyond – and sometimes in opposition to – admittedly widely
shared interests in maximizing the profit of any single corporation.31 Recognizing this
diversity of interests no doubt does complicate corporate decision-making: any candid
assessment must acknowledge that these diverse interests cannot be measured or
accommodated with even a modicum of precision. It also must be acknowledged, on the
other hand, that the broad deference of the business judgment rule has undoubtedly
tolerated, perhaps even masked, managerial behavior accompanied by lip service to
maximizing shareholder wealth but really designed to serve interests other than
stockholder wealth maximization.32 The Business Roundtable’s controversial declaration
29

See Sustainable Signals: Individual Investor Interest Driven by Impact, Conviction and
Choice, MORGAN STANLEY INST. SUSTAINABLE INVESTING, 3-4 (2019),
https://www.morganstanley.com/pub/content/dam/msdotcom/infographics/sustainableinvesting/Sustainable_Signals_Individual_Investor_White_Paper_Final.pdf (finding that
eighty-five percent of surveyed American stockholders are interested in investing in
companies that pursue social and/or environmental objectives); Robert G. Eccles &
Svetlana Klimenko, The Investor Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. (2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/05/the-investor-revolution (showing that investing firms are
increasingly concerned with the sustainability practices of the corporations they invest
in).
30

A leading exponent of this perspective is The Shareholder Commons, a group
spearheaded by my former law partner Rick Alexander, and on whose advisory board I
serve. THE SHAREHOLDER COMMONS (2020), https://theshareholdercommons.com.
31

See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 773, 770-72 (2005) (arguing that the business judgment rule provides managers the
“discretion” to sacrifice current profits for the public interest because managers can
almost always claim their public-minded actions are directed toward long-term
profitability); Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71
STAN. L. REV. 137, 181-85 (2019) (describing the business judgment rule as a “safe
harbor” for directors to promote environmental policies); see also Janet E. Kerr,
Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business Judgment
Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L.
11
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in 2019 can only encourage managers of large corporations to take advantage of that
flexibility.33 And the advent of the public benefit corporation enables businesses to
promote a public purpose overtly instead of having to justify such conduct with lip
service to stockholder wealth maximization.34 By requiring a public purpose to be set
forth explicitly in the corporation’s governing documents and requiring the corporation to
report regularly on how it has attempted to serve that purpose,35 thereby bringing publicregarding managerial action into public view, the benefit corporation structure may
reduce the risk that self-serving managerial behavior will masquerade as attention to
public purpose.
Stockholder Litigation and the Populism Canard
Stockholder litigation – specifically shareholder class actions, appraisal cases, and
derivative suits – is a more traditional check on managerial misconduct. Indeed, the

REV. 623, 634-35 (2007) (going a step further to argue that directors are not only
protected by the business judgment rule, but also have a duty to be informed about social
entrepreneurship and consider environmental sustainability in their decision making).
32

BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORP. (Aug. 2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment (declaring that the purpose of
corporations is to serve all stakeholders, not just shareholders, with an emphasis on longterm value); see also Richard Henderson & Patrick Temple-West, Group of US
Corporate Leaders Ditches Shareholder-First Mantra, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/e21a9fac-c1f5-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 (discussing the
Roundtable’s statement as a “significant departure from the bedrock belief” of
shareholder primacy, and identifying policymakers and directors who support such a
shift); Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, & Karessa L. Cain, Thoughts for Boards of
Directors in 2020, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/12/10/thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020
(pointing out to directors that the business judgment rule protects them in acting on
behalf of stakeholders and advocating for the Business Roundtable’s statement).
33

See generally William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations
are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV.
817 (2012) (surveying the policies behind and key features of benefit corporations);
MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION § 101 cmt. (B LAB Apr. 17, 2017)
(explaining that public benefit corporations “operate with a corporate purpose broader
than maximizing shareholder value and a responsibility to consider the impact of its
decisions on all stakeholders, not just shareholders”).
35

E.g., 8 Del. C. §§ 362(a), 366(b).
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managerial agency costs narrative noted above has nurtured a perception among many
academics that stockholder litigation is an essential mechanism to protect a class of
persons (investors) who are relatively weak and vulnerable to abuse by corporate
managers.36 How, then, could a liberal, social justice-oriented lawyer like me be content
to defend controlling stockholders, directors and takeover targets in litigation brought to
protect that relatively weak and vulnerable constituency?
My response is that unlike classes of consumers or racial or ethnic identity
groups, stockholders are not, as a class, oppressed victims of corporate conduct. In fact,
any populist analogy that would view investors in that light strikes me as offensive when
invoked on behalf of stockholders, like me, who enjoy substantial wealth and privileged
status and upbringing. Stockholder litigation is largely a dry affair, with little at stake
beyond marginal differences of opinion about, and impacts on, financial worth.37 The fact
that such marginal differences, in the context of publicly traded companies, amount to
millions or sometimes even billions of dollars in the aggregate, makes stockholder class

35

See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (declaring
shareholder derivative suites as the “chief regulator of corporate management”); John C.
Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and
a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981) (proposing legislation
to bolster shareholder litigation as a primary mechanism of corporate governance);
Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Papers of
Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 323 (1986) (arguing that
shareholder litigation “profoundly affect[s] the conduct of corporate managers); Randall
Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: AcquisitionOriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 143 (2004) (explaining how derivative
actions “have historically played key roles in checking . . . managerial abuses”).
36

Indeed, shareholder litigation often involves disputes over just a couple dollars per
share. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005) (decades of
litigation, including six appeals to the Delaware Supreme Court, attempting to dispute the
share value price with the value only fluctuating within a range of $21.98 to $28.41);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (challenging a merger in which the
controlling stockholder acquired the minority shares for $21 per share when they might
have been willing to pay up to $24 per share); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (finding a breach of fiduciary duties where
directors accept a tender offer of $57.25 per share instead of $56.25, which was less
accounting for the time value of money).
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action litigation viable, but at the same time it creates agency costs and pathologies in the
way stockholder litigation is conducted.38
For example, while still in private practice I represented defendants in a
stockholder derivative action on behalf of a Delaware corporation but brought in a West
Virginia state court, where the claim was that the directors’ negligence was responsible
for cost overruns on a new manufacturing facility.39 Unlike the vast majority of Delaware
corporations, this corporation’s certificate of incorporation for some unknown reason
failed to include a provision eliminating director monetary liability for lack of care. Such
a provision might have avoided the litigation, but the case went forward, at considerable
cost to the corporation (through advancement of defense costs). Those out of pocket
costs, moreover, were not the most debilitating: the reaction of management, before the
case settled, was to bend over in contortions to avoid taking any action or responsibility,
lest they elicit even more claims of negligence and risks of liability.40 In short, derivative
litigation can impose costs on the corporation – and indirectly its stockholders – just as
easily, if not more frequently, than it can achieve any benefits to the corporation.
In this century, there have been several waves of stockholder litigation that were
widely viewed as abusive and inefficient. One such wave featured stockholder class
actions involving mergers negotiated and approved at arm’s length, which were
37

See generally Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 35, at 283 (“[A] derivative action evokes
a response of group loyalty, so that even a ‘maverick’ director may feel compelled to
close ranks and protect his fellows from the attack of the ‘strike suiter.’”); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory
for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 669, 714 (1986) (“Often, the plaintiff’s attorneys and the defendants can settle on a
basis that is adverse to the interests of the plaintiffs.”).
38

See State ex rel. Elish v. Wilson, 434 S.E.2d 411 (1993).

39

The potential to generate excessive precaution costs is a significant element of the
pathologies that can arise from aggregate shareholder litigation. See Steven M.
Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 50 (2002) (pointing out that “[s]hareholder litigation encourages directors to be
risk averse,” which increases costs because of suboptimal decision making and additional
monitoring needs); Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate
Law, 66 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 887, 895-96 (explaining that the risk of liability from
shareholder litigation causes directors to spend high sums on legal advice and act too
cautiously in business decisions).
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challenged under Revlon, despite the absence of conflict of interest, due to alleged
shortcomings in the sale process.41 Largely settled through supplemental disclosure and
payment of hefty attorney’s fees, with no recovery by the stockholder class members,42
these cases proliferated43 until reined in by more stringent standards for approval of
disclosure-only settlements,44 by forum selection bylaws that limited multi-forum
litigation pressures,45 and by increased doctrinal reliance on the cleansing effect of
stockholder voting approval.46 Another wave involved Delaware statutory appraisal

40

Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Importance of Being Dismissive:
The Efficiency Role of Pleading Stage Evaluation of Shareholder Litigation, 42 J. CORP.
L. 597, 600 (2017) (citing references to a “growing tide of litigation” exacting a “merger
tax” “ultimately borne by shareholders and collected by the plaintiffs’ class action bar”).
41

Id., citing Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 478 tbl. III (2015);
see Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, 4-5 (Jan.
16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Berkeley Center for Law, Business and
the Economy), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715890 (showing
that only 3.8% of settlements include non-disclosure elements and tracking attorney fee
agreement values).
42

Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015) (finding that the
percentage of large mergers that resulted in shareholder litigation increased from 39.3%
in 2005 to 92.1% in 2011).
43

In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“[T]he Court
will continue to be increasingly vigilant in applying its independent judgment to its caseby-case assessment of the reasonableness of the ‘give’ and ‘get’ of [disclosure]
settlements . . . .”). The court specified that disclosure settlements would be disfavored
“unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material misrepresentation or
omission” and any proposed liability release narrowly applies only to disclosure and
fiduciary duty claims that have been sufficiently investigated.
44

See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 962 (Del. Ch.
2013) (authorizing forum-selection bylaws limiting litigation regarding internal affairs to
Delaware); Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to
Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 44 (2017) (finding
that forum-selection clauses dramatically increased between 2012-2014, resulting in 746
U.S.-domiciled public corporations adopting exclusive-forum clauses, with ninety-three
percent of those selecting Delaware as the exclusive forum).
45

See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 313 (Del. 2015) (“When the
real parties in interest—the disinterested equity owners—can easily protect themselves at
the ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review
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litigation fueled by so-called appraisal arbitrage, and also involving arm’s length deals.47
That wave was quelled to some extent by amendments to the appraisal statute
establishing minimum amounts in controversy,48 but to a much greater extent by judicial
rulings emphasizing the valuation significance of market transactions (the sale price
itself, or share market prices, or both) and effectively limiting recovery to the deal price,
or less.49
Skepticism about the limits of shareholder litigation, however, is not the same as
implacable opposition to such litigation. In Delaware’s system of corporate law,
representative stockholder plaintiffs, and their lawyers, are a bulwark against
misappropriation and electoral manipulation by self-interested directors, officers, and
controlling stockholders, and are therefore a critical promoter of efficient, wealth-creating
corporate governance.50 So despite recognizing deficiencies in Delaware’s shareholder
promises more costs to stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risktaking than it promises in terms of benefits to them.”).
47

See Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder
Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J. L. & ECON. 697, 699 (2016) (documenting the
evolution of appraisal arbitrage in Delaware from 2000-2014 and finding that the amount
of petitions increased from roughly two percent to twenty-five percent of eligible deals).
48

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2016) (restricting appraisal rights to instances where
shareholders seeking appraisal amount to one percent of outstanding shares or $1 million
in merger consideration).
48

See DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 349 (Del. 2017)
(explaining that, in open and arm’s length mergers, the “best evidence of fair value [is]
the deal price”); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d
1, 30 (Del. 2017) (reinforcing DFC by finding that “Dell’s deal price has heavy, if not
overriding, probative value” in appraisal proceedings); Verition Partners Master Fund
Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 136 (Del. 2019) (giving “important weight
to market-tested deal prices” to again award an appraisal value far below that sought by
the dissenters and below even the deal price). See also S. Michael Sirkin, Appraisal After
Aruba Networks: What Do Jarden, Columbia Pipeline, and Stillwater Mining Teach Us?,
23 M&A LAWYER 1, 6 (2019) (describing the trend against appraisal arbitrage); Wei
Jiang, Tao Li, & Randall S. Thomas, The Long Rise and Quick Fall of Appraisal
Arbitrage (February 28, 2020). Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 20-16, available
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3546281 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3546281 (finding
that the principal reason for the decline in appraisal arbitrage were the appraisal opinions
from the Delaware Supreme Court in 2017, cited above).
49

See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Delaware Corporate
Fiduciary Law: Searching for the Optimal Balance, in EVAN J. CRIDDLE, PAUL B.
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litigation system, I have been proud to be part of drafting legislation that prohibited feeshifting charter and bylaw provisions that, while addressing inefficient litigation, could
have effectively eliminated shareholder litigation as a check on corporate misbehavior.51
Conclusion
It has been a privilege to have had the opportunity to reflect on over four decades
of practicing and teaching Delaware corporate law, and to be able to share my
perspective on that opportunity with the rarefied – and, with all affection, nerdy – cohort
of students of that field of the law. My experience has been nothing like a study of
“towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing
nothing but wind,”52 and it would not be unreasonable to expect that in the next four
decades the subject be at least as challenging.

MILLER, AND ROBERT H. SITKOFF, EDS., OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Oxford
Univ. Press 2019) (explaining through a survey of fiduciary duty doctrine that directors
enjoy broad autonomy, but when there may be a conflict of interest, shareholder litigation
serves as a check on mismanagement).
51

See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 40, at 600-01, n.9 (describing 2015
amendments to Sections 102 and 109 of the Delaware General Corporation Law that
prohibit fee-shifting provisions that burden stockholder plaintiffs). See also Ashiq Ali &
Brad Nathan, Do Shareholders Benefit from Fee-Shifting Bylaws?, [forthcoming]
(finding negative returns associated with release of the Delaware Supreme Court opinion
in ATP Tour v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014), approving bylaws
providing for shifting litigation expenses to plaintiff stockholders who are less than
wholly successful in litigation).
52

Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
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